-
作者：Azariadis, C; Bullard, J; Ohanian, L
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Aggregate time series provide evidence of short-term dynamic adjustment that appears to be governed by complex or negative real eigenvalues. This finding is at odds with the predictions of reasonably parameterized, convex one-sector growth models with complete markets. We study life-cycle economies in which aggregate saving depends non-trivially on the distribution of wealth among cohorts. If consumption goods are weak gross substitutes near the steady-state price vector, we prove that the uni...
-
作者：Sabourian, H
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players' preferences, together with the standard ...
-
作者：d'Aspremont, C; Crémer, J; Gérard-Varet, LA
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all the other conditions found in the literature. We also Study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All ri...
-
作者：Williams, N
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop analytic asymptotic methods to characterize time-series properties of nonlinear dynamic stochastic models. We focus on a stochastic growth model which is representative of the models underlying much of modern macroeconomics. Taking limits as the stochastic shocks become small, we derive a functional central limit theorem, a large deviation principle, and a moderate deviation principle. These allow us to calculate analytically the asymptotic distribution of the capital stock, and to ...
-
作者：Mahenc, P; Salanié, F
作者单位：INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Perpignan Via Domitia
摘要：In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed that high prices resulted from a cartel's long positions. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices are increased compared to the case without forward trading. This result contrasts with the social desirability of forward markets emphasized by the academic li...
-
作者：Nishimura, KG; Ozaki, H
作者单位：Tohoku University; University of Tokyo
摘要：Suppose that uncertainty about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change induce an unemployed worker to search longer, or shorter? This paper shows that the answer is drastically different depending on whether an increase in uncertainty is an increase in risk or that in true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight. We show in a general framework that, while an increase in risk (the mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution that the worker thinks she faces) increases the re...
-
作者：Olszewski, W
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The typical sender-receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model predicts information revelation as a unique equilibrium. This uniqueness result contrasts with the multiplicity of equilibria in games with uninformed receiver. To achieve information revelation as a unique equilibrium, receiver may have to as...
-
作者：Campbell, CM
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 61 (1971) 561) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public informati...
-
作者：Delgado, J; Moreno, D
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In an industry where firms compete via supply functions, the set of equilibrium outcomes is large. If decreasing supply functions are ruled out, this set is reduced significantly, but remains large. Specifically, the set of prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria is the interval between the competitive price and the Cournot price. In sharp contrast, when the number of firms is above a threshold we identify (e.g., three if demand is linear), only the Cournot outcome can be su...
-
作者：Meagher, KJ; Zauner, KG
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We investigate Hotelling's duopoly game of location-then-price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand. We characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations. Contrary to the individual-level random utility models, location uncertainty is a differentiation force. In equilibrium, increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation,...
