The evolution of exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ben-Shoham, A; Serrano, R; Volij, O
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; Brown University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00112-1
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 310-328
• 关键词: stochastic stability; exchange; housing problem; EFFICIENCY; envy

摘要

Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models, traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models differ in the probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set of stochastically stable allocations contains the set of efficient allocations. When more serious mistakes are less likely, the stochastically stable states are those allocations, always efficient, with the lowest envy level. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.