作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider one-to-one matching problems when preferences are weak orders and search for (Maskin-)mono tonic and implementable solutions. We show that for any coalition structure F, the strong F-core is monotonic if and only if it is the individually rational solution. We introduce a solution, which we call the union strong F-core, and show that this solution is the minimal way to expand the strong F-core recovering monotonicity. We also show that the union strong F-core is implementable. (C) ...
作者：Ishiguro, S
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：In a principal-multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through side-transfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a discriminatory policy in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend oil their identities even if they are identical with respect to ...
