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作者：Marinacci, M; Montrucchio, L
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin
摘要：We establish a calculus characterization of the core of supermodular games, which reduces the description of the core to the computation of suitable Gateaux derivatives of the Choquet integrals associated with the game. Our result generalizes a classic result of Shapley (Internat. J. Game Theory 1 (1971) 11) to infinite games. As an application, we show that this representation takes a stark form for supermodular measure games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Jun, B; Vives, X
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Korea University
摘要：We compare steady states of open loop and locally stable Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment. Strategic incentives at the MPE depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the MPE there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity. A full characterization is provided in the linear-quadratic case. Then with price competition and costly producti...
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作者：Thanassoulis, J
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Using a model of substitutable goods I determine generic conditions on tastes which guarantee that fixed prices are not optimal: the fully optimal tariff includes lotteries. That is, a profit maximising seller would employ a haggling strategy. We show that the fully optimal selling strategy in a class of cases requires a seller to not allow themselves to focus on one good but to remain haggling over more than one good. This throws new light on the selling strategies used in diverse industries....
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作者：Chatterji, S; Ghosal, S
作者单位：University of Warwick; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectations over market variables differ from their equilibrium values and are not common knowledge. This results in a coordination problem as traders use the structure of the market game to converge back to ...
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作者：Wallace, N; Zhu, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Cornell University
摘要：We apply a commodity-money refinement to matching models in which people meet in pairs and buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to sellers. The refinement is applied by attaching a utility value to nominal money and letting that value approach zero. An equilibrium satisfies the refinement if it is such a limit. We show that the refinement eliminates a class of non-full-support steady states. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Echenique, F; Oviedo, J
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing t...
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作者：Nehring, K; Puppe, C
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods. It is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs (roughly) if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases. This case of substitutive synergies is argued to be typical. The key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate Moebius inversion in terms of higher-order differences. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kalandrakis, A
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member-if a majority prefer so-or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian equilibria do not apply for this dynamic game, we fully characterize a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that irrespective of the dis...
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作者：Tse, CY
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper embeds product market search in an Ak growth model to study the effects of search frictions on market structure, capital accumulation, and long-run growth. The basic hypothesis is that search frictions, in giving rise to market power, result in higher prices and lower output levels. The failing demand for capital stemming from firms cutting back output then lowers the interest rate, dampening capital accumulation and slowing down growth. A decline in search frictions sets the proces...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Nicolò, A
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Padua
摘要：We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care about the number of other consumers. We show that strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independence condition must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. A hierarchical rule selects participants and a generalized median rule selects the level of the Public good. Under heterogeneity in agents' views oil the optimal number...
