Continuous-time games of timing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laraki, R; Solan, E; Vieille, N
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 206-238
• 关键词: Timing games; continuous-time games; games of timing; war of attrition; preemption games

摘要

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for each epsilon > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.