On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Espino, E
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.010
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 192-213
• 关键词: Dynamic contracts; capital accumulation; private information

摘要

In his seminal paper of 1928, Ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level. The validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments. In particular, it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets. This paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents. A version of Bayesian implementation is introduced and a recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established. Efficient allocations are renegotiation-proof and the expected utility of any agent cannot go to zero with positive probability if the economy does not collapse. If the economy collapses all agents will get zero consumption forever. Thus, including any degree of private information in the neoclassical growth model will deny Ramsey's conjecture, if efficient allocations are considered. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.