Learning aspiration in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cho, IK; Matsui, A
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 171-201
• 关键词: aspiration; bounded rationality; COOPERATION; mean dynamics; recursive learning; repeated games; satisficing behaviors; stochastic approximation

摘要

We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2x2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we characterize the asymptotic outcomes for all 2x2 games. In the prisoners' dilemma game, for example, the players cooperate in the limit if and only if the gain from defecting against cooperation is modest. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.