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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Ehlers, Lars; Kar, Anirban
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; University of Warwick; Universite de Montreal; University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics
摘要：We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lester, Benjamin
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：I construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create. Within this framework, the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously, wages play an allocative role in the matching process, and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms. I characterize the (unique) equilibrium. Comparative statics generate testable implications for cross-sectional variation in ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; de Clippel, Geoffroy
作者单位：Brown University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer's underlying preferences. We characterize those data sets which can be generated by rational preferences exhibiting complementarities. The class of preferences that generate demand complements has Leontief and Cobb Douglas as its as extreme me...
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作者：Cuong Le Van; Schubert, Katheline; Tu Anh Nguyen
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of Exeter
摘要：This paper studies the optimal growth of a developing non-renewable natural resource producer. It extracts the resource, and produces a single consumption good with man-made capital. Moreover, it can sell the extracted resource abroad and use the revenues to buy an imported good, perfect substitute of the domestic consumption good. The domestic technology is convex concave, so that the economy may be locked into a poverty trap. We show that the extent to which the country will escape from the ...
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作者：Lamy, Laurent
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We find an error in [H. Cai, J. Riley, L. Ye, Reserve price signaling, J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253268]. The existence of the separating signaling equilibrium is not challenged, but the related comparative statics, while valid in the case without informational externalities between bidders, do not generalize to the case with informational externalities as claimed by the authors. General results on the influence of the number of bidders are obtained in a linear specification of the inform...
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作者：Dana, R. A.; Le Van, C.
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of Exeter; Paris School of Economics
摘要：The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. No-arbitrage conditions are given in terms of risk adjusted priors. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is the overlapping of the interiors of the risk adjusted sets of priors or the inexistence of mutually compatible trades, with non-negative expectation with respect to any risk adjusted prior. These conditions are necess...
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作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi; Miyazaki, Koichi; Yagi, Nobuyuki
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of...
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作者：Grochulski, Borys; Kocherlakota, Narayana
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of...
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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We present a noncooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person cooperative game in strategic form. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle. We prove that the Nash bargaining solution can be supported (in every subgame) by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if th...
