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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：It is well known that when agents' types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents' types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of robust and partially robust lotteries are derived. If an...
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作者：Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs. The contrary result of Neeman [Z. Neeman, The relevance of private information in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 117 (2004) 55-77] rest...
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作者：Grabiszewski, Konrad
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：Type space is of fundamental importance in epistemic game theory. This paper shows how to build type space if players approach the game in a way advocated by Bernheim's justification procedure. If an agent fixes a strategy profile of her opponents and ponders which of their beliefs about her set of strategies make this profile optimal, such an analysis is represented by kernels and yields disintegrable beliefs. Our construction requires that underlying space is Polish. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Thijssen, Jacco J. J.
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：In this paper a two-player real option game with a first-mover advantage is analyzed, where payoffs are driven by a player-specific stochastic state variable. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium which has qualitatively different properties from those in standard real option games driven by common stochastic shocks. The properties of the equilibrium are four-fold: (i) preemption does not necessarily occur, (ii) if preemption takes place, the rent-equalization property holds, (iii) for ...
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作者：Ressner, Ludwig; Liski, Matti; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：University of Munich; Aalto University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our resu...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Sandroni, Alvaro; Smorodinsky, Rann; Weinstein, Jonathan
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the problem of testing an expert whose theory has a learnable and predictive parametric representation, as do standard processes used in statistics. We design a test in which the expert is required to submit a date T by which he will have learned enough to deliver a sharp, testable prediction about future frequencies. We show that this test passes an expert who knows the data-generating process and cannot be manipulated by a uninformed one. Such a test is not possible if the theory is...
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作者：Jarque, Arantxa
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study a problem of repeated moral hazard where the effect of effort is persistent over time: each period's outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts. I show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort, a simple rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a related standard repeated moral hazard. The solutions for consumption in the two problems are observationally equivalent, implying that the main propert...
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作者：Beker, Pablo; Chattopadhyay, Subir
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of York - UK
摘要：We introduce a methodology for analysing infinite horizon economies with two agents, one good, and incomplete markets. We provide an example in which an agent's equilibrium consumption is zero eventually with probability one even if she has correct beliefs and is marginally more patient. We then prove the following general result: if markets are effectively incomplete forever then on any equilibrium path on which some agent's consumption is bounded away from zero eventually, the other agent's ...
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作者：Garcia-Martinez, Jose A.
作者单位：Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
摘要：We consider a selection process and a hierarchical institution in a dynamic model as in Harrington (1998) [4], where agents are climbing the pyramid in a rank-order contest based on the up or out policy. Agents are matched in pairs to compete, and each pair faces a particular environment. They are ranked according to the quality of their performances in this particular environment, and a fraction of the highest ranked agents are promoted. The size of this fraction characterizes the selectivity...
