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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock Paper Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium is identical in the two games, but the predicted frequency of Dumb is much higher in the game where the NE is stable. Consistent with TASP, the observed frequency of Dumb is lower and pla...
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作者：Mitchell, Matthew; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could monitor the savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, we obtain a closed form solution of the optimal contract. Under the optimal contract, the agent is neither saving nor borrowing constrained. Counter-intuitively, his consumption dec...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：There are n agents who have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions on a finite set of alternatives A. Each agent i's utility function is known to lie in the nonempty, convex, relatively open set U-i. Suppose L is a lottery on A that is undominated, meaning that there is no other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate L no matter what the true utility functions are. Then, there exist utility functions u(i) is an element of U-i for which L is Pareto efficient. This result includes the ...
