Reserve price signaling (vol 135, pg 253, 2007)

• 成果类型: Correction
• 署名作者: Lamy, Laurent
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.009
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2498-2504
• 关键词: Auctions; reserve price; signaling

摘要

We find an error in [H. Cai, J. Riley, L. Ye, Reserve price signaling, J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253268]. The existence of the separating signaling equilibrium is not challenged, but the related comparative statics, while valid in the case without informational externalities between bidders, do not generalize to the case with informational externalities as claimed by the authors. General results on the influence of the number of bidders are obtained in a linear specification of the informational externalities. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.