Cores of combined games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; de Clippel, Geoffroy
• 署名单位: Brown University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2424-2434
• 关键词: Cooperative games; core; Additivity; issue linkage; multi-issue bargaining

摘要

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.