Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.007
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1704-1723
• 关键词: Substitutes; Bilateral substitutes; Unilateral substitutes; matching; matching with contracts; Law of aggregate demand; STABILITY; strategy-proofness; Rural hospitals theorem; Group strategy-proofness; lattice

摘要

We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral substitutes condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substitutes, the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors' preferences, but there does exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation, and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.