Two-sided matching with interdependent values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chakraborty, Archishman; Citanna, Alessandro; Ostrovsky, Michael
• 署名单位: Stanford University; York University - Canada; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 85-105
• 关键词: Interdependent values; STABILITY; matching

摘要

We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if Students have different preferences. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.