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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Cremer, Jacques; Dobos, Gergely
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic model with an incumbent monopolist and entry in every subsequent period. We first show that if all consumers have the same switching cost, then the intertemporal profits of the incumbent are the same as if there was only one period. We then study the consequences of heterogeneity of switching costs. We prove that even low switching cost customers have value for the incumbent: when there are more of them its profits increase as their presence hinders entrants who find it more...
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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper explores the implications of the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) [8] for the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle. The model predicts that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical with debt increasing in recessions and decreasing in booms. Public spending increases in booms and decreases during recessions, while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in recessions. In both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost of p...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities. The players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. They learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions. We develop new methods of analysis for such large games, and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria. We show that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exp...
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作者：Del Rey, Elena; Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel
作者单位：Universitat de Girona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general fail to achieve optimality because individuals accumulate amounts of physical capital that differ from the one that maximizes welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, related to education decisions. We propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and also human capital accumulation. We characterize th...
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作者：Rachmilevitch, Shiran
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Montrucchio, Luigi
作者单位：Bocconi University; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
摘要：Starting with the seminal paper of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) [32] an analogy between the maxmin approach of decision theory under ambiguity and the minimax approach of robust statistics - e.g., Blum and Rosenblatt (1967) [10] has been hinted at. The present paper formally clarifies this relation by showing the conditions under which the two approaches are actually equivalent. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Khan, M. All; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for player's names. In a sufficiently general context of traits and actions, we address this dissonance by showing a saturated probability space as being a necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and ...
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作者：Renault, Jerome; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider a dynamic version of sender receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the re...
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作者：Sato, Shin
作者单位：Fukuoka University
摘要：I consider whether the agents' reluctance to make a large lie is helpful for the rule designer to construct a nonmanipulable rule. For this purpose, I study an axiom, called AM-proofness, saying that manipulation cannot occur through preferences adjacent to the sincere one. Through examples, I give rationales for AM-proofness. My main result is a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of AM-proofness and strategy-proofness. I show that the sufficient condition is satisfied by the...
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作者：Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values. We base our analysis on the equilibria characterized by Deneckere and Liang (2006) for the gap case. We show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero, the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to smooth screening over time. In the double limit prices are independent of the shape of the distribution ...
