Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rachmilevitch, Shiran
• 署名单位: University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1714-1725
• 关键词: Auctions; Bid rotation; collusion; repeated games

摘要

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.