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作者：Lu, Yang K.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper considers a reputation model of optimal taxation in which the public is unsure about the government type. A long-lived government can be trustworthy (meaning that it commits to its announced tax rate) or opportunistic (meaning that it retains the ability to change its tax rate after announcing it). Unlike in most prior studies, the committed strategy in this model is optimally chosen by the trustworthy type. We show that this change has significant consequences for the equilibrium d...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Bern; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Rice University
摘要：Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optima...
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作者：Mitra, Tapan; Asheim, Geir B.; Buchholz, Wolfgang; Withagen, Cees
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Oslo; University of Regensburg; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：We provide a general condition under which consumption can be sustained indefinitely bounded away from zero in the continuous time Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model, by letting augmentable capital substitute for a non-renewable resource. The assumptions made on the production function are mild, thus generalizing previous work. By showing that Hartwick's rule minimizes the required resource input per unit of capital accumulation, and integrating the required resource input with respect to capi...
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作者：Duddy, Conal; Piggins, Ashley
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Ollscoil na Gaillimhe-University of Galway
摘要：A model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a triangular norm which establishes a lower bound on the degree to which a proposition is true whenever it is entailed by a set of propositions. Under standard assumptions, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the collective judgments to be both deductively closed and free from veto power. This ...
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作者：Seel, Christian; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solu...
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作者：Artemov, Georgy; Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Hitotsubashi University; Brown University
摘要：We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions A, we use triangle-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, A-incentive compatibility and is-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of fir...
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作者：Han, Seungjin
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus o...
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作者：Nourry, Carine; Seegmuller, Thomas; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Universitaire de France; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School
摘要：We re-examine the destabilizing role of balanced-budget fiscal policy rules based on consumption taxation. Using a one-sector model with infinitely-lived households, we consider a specification of preferences derived from Jaimovich (2008) [14] and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) [15] which is flexible enough to encompass varying degrees of income effect. When the income effect is not too large, we show that there exists a Laffer curve, which explains the multiplicity of steady states, and that non...
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作者：Holmberg, Par; Newbery, David; Ralph, Daniel
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：In most electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers to a uniform price auction. These markets are often modelled as simpler pure-strategy Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) with continuous supply functions. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the required steps drastically change Nash equilibria, invalidating predictions of the SFE model. We prove that there are sufficient conditions, offered quantities can be continuously varied, offered prices are selec...
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作者：Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the behavior of an agent who dislikes large choice sets because of the 'cost of thinking' involved in choosing from them. Focusing on preferences over lotteries of menus, we introduce the notion of Thinking Aversion. We characterize preferences as the difference between an affine evaluation of the content of the menu and a function that assigns to each menu a thinking cost. We provide conditions for which this cost can be seen as the cost that the agent has to sustain to figure out he...
