Dynamic sender-receiver games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Renault, Jerome; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 502-534
• 关键词: Sender-receiver; dynamic games; Bayesian games; COMMUNICATION; repeated games

摘要

We consider a dynamic version of sender receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.