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作者：Campos, Rodolfo G.
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：I add heterogeneous agents and risk-sharing opportunities to a global game of regime change. The novel insight is that when there is a risk-sharing motive, fundamentals drive not only individual behavior, but also select which individuals are more relevant for the likelihood of a crisis because of endogenous shifts in wealth. If attacking is relatively safe, attack behavior in the global game and trade in state-contingent assets feed back into each other. This feedback implies that multiple eq...
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作者：Mathevet, Laurent; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Northwestern University
摘要：We present a family of tractable dynamic global games and its applications. Agents privately learn about a fixed fundamental, and repeatedly adjust their investments while facing frictions. The game exhibits many externalities: payoffs may depend on the volume of investment, on its volatility, and on its concentration. The solution is driven by an invariance result: aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to a large family of frictions. We use the invariance result to exam...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We consider dynamic decision making in a legislature, in which in each period legislators vote between the status quo (previous period's policy) and a new bill. However, the agenda formation process is captured by interest groups, that is, the new bill on the agenda is determined by an all-pay auction among these groups. We show that convergence to the median voter of the legislature arises if interest groups are patient enough but not necessarily otherwise. We characterize the bound on the sp...
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作者：Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of London
摘要：The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Carlier, G.; Dana, R. -A.
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized b...
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作者：Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (external transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agent's type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of external transfers allows us to obtain an exact characterization of the set of implementable allocation rules (the set of transfers is non-empty) and the set of allocation rules satisfying Revenue Equivalence (the extremal transfers coincide). We then sho...
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作者：Menzio, Guido; Shi, Shouyong; Sun, Hongfei
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We construct and analyze a tractable search model of money with a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. Analytical tractability comes from modeling decentralized exchange as directed search, which makes the monetary steady state block recursive. By adapting lattice-theoretic techniques, we characterize individuals' policy and value functions, and show that these functions satisfy the standard conditions of optimization. We prove that a unique monetary steady state exists and provide c...
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作者：Dottori, Davide; Estevan, Fernanda; Shen, I-Ling
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Ottawa; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This paper studies how the schooling system may be impacted by the number and skill type of immigrants. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become segregated. Wealthy locals are more likely to choose private schools and vote for a lower tax rate to finance public education. In contrast, high-skilled immigrants tend to reinforce the public system. The optimal immigration policy is highly skill-biased. The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedit...
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作者：Jacquet, Laurence; Lehmann, Etienne; Van der Linden, Bruno
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We study optimal income taxation when labor supply reacts along the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and disutility of participation. We develop a new method to analytically derive conditions under which optimal marginal tax rates are non-negative everywhere. It is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with negligible earnings. Numerical simulations illustrate thes...
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作者：Johnson, T. R.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated positive assortative matching) maximizes profits. Under these conditions, all-pay position auctions always implement the profit-maximizing allocation. Winners-pay position auctions, however, only d...
