Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carlier, G.; Dana, R. -A.
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1606-1623
• 关键词: Incomplete preferences; Efficient allocations and equilibria

摘要

An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.