Eliciting information from a committee

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• 署名单位: University of London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2049-2067
• 关键词: communication; multidimensional mechanism design; experts; collusion; Axiomatic bargaining; Closed rule

摘要

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.