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作者：Foellmi, Reto; Wuergler, Tobias; Zweimueller, Josef
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Zurich
摘要：We study a model of growth and mass production. Firms undertake either product innovations that introduce new luxury goods for the rich; or process innovations that transform existing luxuries into mass products for the poor. A prototypical example for such a product cycle is the automobile. Initially, an exclusive product for the very rich, the automobile became affordable to the middle class after the introduction of Ford's Model T, the car that put America on wheels. We present a model of n...
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作者：Opp, Marcus M.; Parlour, Christine A.; Walden, Johan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition with a continuum of heterogeneous industries. Industries are exposed to aggregate and industry-specific productivity shocks. Firms in each industry set value-maximizing state-contingent markups, taking as given the behavior of all other industries. When consumers are risk-averse, industry markups are countercyclical with regards to the industry-specific component, but may be procyclical with regards to the ag...
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作者：Tang, Qianfeng; Yu, Jingsheng
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We revisit the school choice problem with consent proposed by Kesten [12], which seeks to improve the efficiency of the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) by obtaining students' consent to give up their priorities. We observe that for students to consent, we should use their consent only when their assignments are Pareto unimprovable. Inspired by this perspective, we propose a new algorithm which iteratively reruns DA after removing students who have been matched with underdema...
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作者：Ales, Laurence; Maziero, Pricila; Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents. Our first main result is that, in the most favorable equilibrium to the households, distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run. This result is driven by...
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作者：Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk, and show that when these conditions are violated, it may be possible to construct informative cheap-talk equilibria. If the firms can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk...
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作者：Heufer, Jan
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：We introduce a nonparametric method to compare risk aversion of different investors based on revealed preference methods. Using Yaari's (1969) [50] definition of more risk averse than, we show that it is sufficient to compare the revealed preference relations of two investors. This makes the approach operational; the central rationalisability theorem provides strong support for this approach. We also provide a measure of economic significance to quantify the differences in risk aversion, which...
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作者：Richter, Michael
作者单位：Yeshiva University
摘要：I consider a repeated divide-the-dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period's allocation (see Kalandrakis [14]). I show that if proposals can be non-exhaustive, then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a Markov Perfect equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total ...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We establish that general discounted stochastic games with state transitions that are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed, atomless measure admit stationary semi-Markov perfect equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each player's action depends only on the current state and on the previous state and action profile. This resolves an open existence question stemming from an error in the proof of Theorem 4 of Chakrabarti [3]. Moreover, the result follows from un-correlating Nowak and Rag...
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作者：Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of C...
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作者：Dong, Mei; Jiang, Janet Hua
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Bank of Canada
摘要：We study price posting with undirected search in a search-theoretic monetary model with divisible money and divisible goods. Ex ante homogeneous buyers experience match-specific preference shocks in bilateral trades. The shocks follow a continuous uniform distribution, and the realizations of the shocks are private information. We show that there exists a unique monetary equilibrium for generic values of the inflation rate. In equilibrium, each seller posts a continuous pricing schedule that e...
