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作者：Nishimura, Hiroki; Ok, Efe A.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Let X be a compact, or path-connected, metric space whose topological dimension is at least 2. We show that there does not exist a continuous choice function (i.e., single-valued choice correspondence) defined on the collection of all finite feasible sets in X. Not to be void of content, therefore, a revealed preference theory in the context of most infinite consumption spaces must either relinquish the fundamental continuity property or allow for multi-valued choice correspondences. (C) 2014 ...
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作者：Dalkir, Elif; Dalkir, Mehmet
作者单位：University of New Brunswick
摘要：This paper analyzes the optimality of partial tender offers in acquisition of firms. We show that partial offers have no impact on the acquirer's expected profit under complete information. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Nehring, Klaus; Pivato, Marcus; Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Trent University; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice in which the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations ('views') on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/no issues. However, simply complying with the majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collective view. Thus, we consider the Condorcet set: the set of logically consistent views which agree with the majority on a maximal subset of issues. The elements of this set turn ...
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作者：Chambers, Robert G.; Grant, Simon; Polak, Ben; Quiggin, John
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Queensland; Yale University
摘要：The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even in the absence of objective probabilities. We develop a model of uncertainty averse preferences that is based on a mean and a measure of the dispersion of the state-wise utility of an act. The dispersion measure exhibits positive linear ...
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作者：Duffie, Darrell; Malamud, Semyon; Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：Stanford University; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in terms of market connectivity, the expected frequency of their bilateral trading opportunities. We characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect information g...
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作者：Sher, Itai; Kim, Kyoo Il
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Michigan State University; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：We study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions. In our setting, aggregate demand for each item is observable while demand for bundles is not. Nevertheless, our identification result allows us to recover the latter. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights rese...
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作者：Forges, Francoise; Minelli, Enrico
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; University of Brescia
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作者：Liu, Qingmin; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Columbia University; Stanford University
摘要：This paper offers a tractable and fully rational model to study the economics of reputation in a dynamic market with limited record-keeping, i.e., a market in which new entrants observe only the last few periods of play of the long-run player instead of the full history of the market. We show that trust is gradually granted to the opportunistic long-run player despite the fact that his type is perfectly observed by the short-run opponents, and the perfectly informed short-run players ride and ...
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作者：Panebianco, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This paper examines the dynamics of interethnic attitudes in a framework of intergenerational transmission of continuous cultural traits, where children are exposed to parental (vertical) and non-parental (oblique) socializations. Under very general conditions over oblique socialization, vertical socialization ensures convergence, while the structure of oblique socialization determines the steady state class. In particular, the presence of specific socialization schemes, namely, ethnocentrism,...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; De Castro, Luciano; Koutsougeras, Leonidas
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Manchester
摘要：This paper reconsiders the well-known comparison of equilibrium entry levels into a Cournot industry under free entry, second best (control of entry but not production) and first best (control of entry and production). Allowing for the possibility of limited increasing returns to scale in production, this paper generalizes the conclusion of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) [10], that under business-stealing competition, free entry yields more firms than the second-best solution. We also show that un...
