Fully absorbing dynamic compromise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Richter, Michael
• 署名单位: Yeshiva University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 92-104
• 关键词: Dynamic legislative bargaining; Markov perfect equilibria

摘要

I consider a repeated divide-the-dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period's allocation (see Kalandrakis [14]). I show that if proposals can be non-exhaustive, then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a Markov Perfect equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.