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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：We study a class of infinite horizon, discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities. In our class of games, we prove the existence of a stationary Markov Nash equilibrium, as well as provide methods for constructing this least and greatest equilibrium via a simple successive approximation schemes. We also provide results on computable equilibrium comparative statics relative to ordered perturbations of the space of games. Under stronger assumptions, we prove the stationary Marko...
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作者：Kovalenkov, Alexander; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：University of Glasgow; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Consider a financial market with N risk-averse asymmetrically informed traders. When N grows at the same rate as noise trading, prices in competitive and in strategic rational expectations equilibrium converge to each other at a rate of 1/N. Equilibria in the two scenarios are close when noise trading volume per informed trader is large in relation to risk-bearing capacity. Both equilibria converge to the competitive equilibrium of a limit continuum economy as the market becomes large at a slo...
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作者：Bambi, Mauro; Gozzi, Fausto; Licandro, Omar
作者单位：University of York - UK; Luiss Guido Carli University; University of Pisa; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This paper argues that observed long lags in innovation implementation rationalize Schumpeter's statement that wave-like fluctuations in business ... are the form economic development takes in the era of capitalism. Adding implementation delays to an otherwise standard endogenous growth model with expanding product variety, the equilibrium path admits a Hopf bifurcation where consumption, R&D and output permanently fluctuate. This mechanism is quantitatively consistent with the observed medium...
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作者：Hsu, Wen-Tai; Holmes, Thomas J.; Morgan, Frank
作者单位：Singapore Management University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research; Williams College
摘要：Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography and an empirically plausible description of city systems. This paper provides a rationale for central place theory via a dynamic programming formulation of the social planner's problem of city hierarchy. We show that there must be one and only one immediate smaller city between two neighboring larger-sized cities in any optimal solution. If the fixed cost of setting up a city is a power function, then the immediate smaller city...
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作者：Cheung, Man-Wah
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper studies pairwise comparison dynamics for population games with continuous strategy space. We show that the pairwise comparison dynamic is well-defined if certain mild Lipschitz continuity conditions are satisfied. We establish Nash stationarity and positive correlation for pairwise comparison dynamics. Finally, we prove global convergence and local stability under general deterministic evolutionary dynamics in potential games, and global asymptotic stability under pairwise compariso...
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作者：De Sinopoli, Francesco; Meroni, Claudia; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：University of Verona; University of Milano-Bicocca; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such a space to define the corresponding strategically stable sets of equilibria. We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility, and rob...
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作者：Ju, Yuan; Chun, Youngsub; van den Brink, Rene
作者单位：University of York - UK; Seoul National University (SNU); Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with each other for a specific position in the queue. Then, the winner can decide to take up the position or sell it to the others. In the former case, the rest of the players will proceed to compete for the...
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作者：Montez, Joao
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study a model where a central player (the principal) bargains bilaterally with each of several players (the agents) to create and share the surplus of a coalitional game. It is known that, if the payments that were previously agreed (with each of the remaining agents) are renegotiated in case any bilateral negotiation permanently breaks down, then the Shapley value is the unique efficient and individual rational outcome consistent with bilateral Nash bargaining. Here we show that when inste...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Camera, Gabriele
作者单位：University of Basel; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：We study a decentralized trading model as in [7], where a finite number of heterogeneous capacity-constrained sellers compete for a finite number of homogeneous buyers, by posting prices. This directed search model is known to admit symmetric equilibria; yet, uniqueness has proved elusive. This study makes two contributions: a substantive contribution is to establish uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium; a methodological contribution is to develop a tool based on directional derivatives to char...
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作者：Gabriel Rodriguez, Juan; Salas, Rafael
作者单位：Complutense University of Madrid
摘要：Majority voting and social evaluation functions are the main alternatives proposed in the literature for aggregating individual preferences. Despite these being very different, this paper shows that the ranking of income distributions, symmetric under the same transformation, by S-Gini consistent social evaluation functions and majority voting coincide if and only if the inequality index under consideration is the Gini coefficient. In this case, we show that the equally distributed equivalent ...
