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作者：Awaya, Yu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Takahashi (2010) [12] proves a folk theorem in an environment where a continuum of players are randomly matched in each period to play the prisoner's dilemma with a different partner. A key assumption there is that a player can observe her partner's past play without any cost, while she cannot observe the past play of her partner's past partners, the partners of her partner's past partners, and so on. However, Takahashi's [12] result is not robust to the introduction of an infinitesimal cost t...
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作者：Jerez, Belen
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：When the trading process is characterized by search frictions, traders may be rationed so markets need not clear. We build a general equilibrium model with transferable utility where the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity, in the spirit of the Arrow-Debreu theory. Prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics, but also on the probability that their trade is rationed. The standard definition of competitive equilibri...
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作者：Piacquadio, Paolo G.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：I study the egalitarian way of distributing resources across generations. Distributional equity deeply conflicts with the Pareto principle: efficient allocations cannot guarantee that i) each generation be assigned a consumption bundle that is at least as large as an arbitrarily small fraction of the bundle assigned to any other generation and that ii) each generation finds its assigned bundle at least as desirable as an arbitrarily small fraction of the bundle assigned to any other generation...
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作者：Mares, Vlad; Swinkels, Jeroen M.
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Northwestern University
摘要：We provide new tools for studying asymmetric first price auctions, connecting their equilibria to the rho-concavity of the underlying type distributions, and showing how one can use surplus expressions for symmetric auctions to bound equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions. We apply these tools to studying procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, one seller is given an advantage, reflecting for example better reliability or quality. We show conditions under which for any gi...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Lleras, Juan Sebastian; Sadowski, Philipp; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Duke University; Yokohama National University
摘要：We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We elicit subjective information directly from choice behavior by deriving two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts. One representation uniquely identifies information as a probability measure over posteriors and the other identifies information as a partition of the state space. We compare individuals who expect to learn differently in term...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycles algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycles algorithm for the resulting profile of strict prefere...
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作者：Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Yale University
摘要：The size distributions of many economic variables seem to obey the double power law, that is, the power law holds in both the upper and the lower tails. I explain this emergence of the double power law which has important economic, econometric, and social implications using a tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic investment risks. I establish theoretical properties such as existence, uniqueness, and constrained e...
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作者：Cui, Zhenyu
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Brooklyn College (CUNY)
摘要：We correct the results in Proposition 2.2 (p. 2078) of Chen et al. (2011) [1] and the part on comparison of prudence levels on p. 2081. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Galenianos, Manolis
作者单位：University of London
摘要：An equilibrium search model of the labor market is combined with a social network. The key features are that the workers' network transmits information about jobs and that wages and firm entry are determined endogenously. Empirically, the inter-industry variation in aggregate matching efficiency is attributed to variation in referral use. The model predicts that the efficiency of the aggregate matching function is pro-cyclical which is consistent with empirical evidence. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc....
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作者：Daley, Brendan; Green, Brett
作者单位：Duke University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider a signaling model in which receivers observe both the sender's costly signal as well as a stochastic grade that is correlated with the sender's type. In equilibrium, the sender resolves the trade-off between using the costly signal versus relying on the noisy grade to distinguish himself. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition loosely, that the grade is sufficiently informative relative to the dispersion of (marginal) signaling costs across types under which the presence of...
