On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 187-215
• 关键词: Assignment game; core; Set-wise stability; competitive equilibrium

摘要

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.