A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 596-604
• 关键词: Stochastic games; EXISTENCE; stationary equilibrium; Semi-Markov perfect equilibrium

摘要

We establish that general discounted stochastic games with state transitions that are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed, atomless measure admit stationary semi-Markov perfect equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each player's action depends only on the current state and on the previous state and action profile. This resolves an open existence question stemming from an error in the proof of Theorem 4 of Chakrabarti [3]. Moreover, the result follows from un-correlating Nowak and Raghavan's [25] stationary correlated equilibrium, establishing that there is no need to resort to additional, unmodeled state variables. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.