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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Schlag, Karl H.
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Vienna
摘要：This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). Ordients have a natural economic interpretation as marginal rates of substitution. Some examples of ordientable binary relations include the lexicographic order, binary relations resulting from the sequential applications of multiple rationales or binary relations with differentiable representations. We characterize the constrained maxima of binary r...
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作者：Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mohlin, Erik
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper studies categorizations that are optimal for the purpose of making predictions. A subject encounters an object (x, y). She observes the first component, x, and has to predict the second component, y. The space of objects is partitioned into categories. The subject determines what category the new object belongs to on the basis of x, and predicts that its y-value will be equal to the average y-value among the past observations in that category. The optimal categorization minimizes th...
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作者：Erdil, Aytek
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：I study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance. I show that non-wasteful strategy-proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms, however non-wastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization. In fact, the Random Priority mechanism...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Seymour, Robert M.
作者单位：KREA University; IFMR - Graduate School of Business (GSB); University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider reinforcement learning in games with both positive and negative payoffs. The Cross rule is the prototypical reinforcement learning rule in games that have only positive payoffs. We extend this rule to incorporate negative payoffs to obtain the generalized reinforcement learning rule. Applying this rule to a population game, we obtain the generalized reinforcement dynamic which describes the evolution of mixed strategies in the population. We apply the dynamic to the class of Rock S...
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作者：Lauermann, Stephan; Noeldeke, Georg
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Basel
摘要：Stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two-sided matching markets with nontransferable utility. We investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market. Towards this end, we embed the standard marriage markets in a search model with random meetings. We study the limit of steady-state equilibria as exogenous frictions vanish. The main result is that convergence of equilibrium matchings to stable matchings is guaranteed if and only if there is a un...
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作者：Dionne, Georges; Li, Jingyuan
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Lingnan University
摘要：Expected utility functions are limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. We extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent risk aversion. We show that first-order conditional dependent risk aversion is consistent with the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. Our theoretical result proposes new insights into economic a...
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作者：Oyarzun, Carlos; Ruf, Johannes
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of London; University College London
摘要：We provide a general framework to study stochastic sequences related to individual learning in economics, learning automata in computer sciences, social learning in marketing, and other applications. More precisely, we study the asymptotic properties of a class of stochastic sequences that take values in [0, 1] and satisfy a property called bounded expected relative hazard rates. Sequences that satisfy this property and feature small step-size or shrinking step-size converge to 1 with high pro...
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作者：Dupor, Bill; Mehkari, M. Saif
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Richmond
摘要：This paper constructs several models in which, unlike the standard neoclassical growth model, positive news about future technology generates an increase in current consumption, hours and investment. These models are said to exhibit procyclical news shocks. We find that all models that exhibit procyclical news shocks in our paper have two commonalities. There are mechanisms to ensure that: (I) consumption does not crowd out investment, or vice versa; (II) the benefit of forgoing leisure in res...
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作者：Allen, Franklin; Vayanos, Dimitri; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This introduces the symposium on financial economics. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.
