Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deb, Joyee; Kalai, Ehud
• 署名单位: Yale University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1041-1055
• 关键词: Large games; Hindsight stability; Ex-post Nash equilibria; Bayesian Nash equilibria

摘要

Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the consequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and action spaces can be infinite. (c) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.