Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bade, Sophie
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.017
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 221-235
• 关键词: Random incentive mechanisms; ambiguity aversion; experiments; hedging

摘要

In random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment. Agents are assumed to act as if they faced each problem on its own. While this approach is valid when agents are expected utility maximizers, ambiguity-averse agents may use the randomization device to hedge and thereby contaminate the data. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.