Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Erlanson, Albin; Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Southern Denmark
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 137-162
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Consistency; Resource-monotonicity

摘要

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and resource-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.