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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper focuses on welfare properties of equilibria in exchange economies with time-dependent preferences. We reintroduce the notion of time-consistent overall Pareto efficiency proposed by Herings and Rohde (2006) and show that, whenever all agents in the economy are sophisticated, any equilibrium allocation is efficient in this sense. Therefore, we present a version of the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem for this class of economies. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Freeman, David
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：Calibration results in Rabin (2000) and Safra and Segal (2008, 2009) suggest that both expected and non-expected utility theories cannot produce non-negligible risk aversion over small stakes without producing implausible risk aversion over large stakes. This paper provides calibration results for recursive non-expected utility theories that relax the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom (as in Segal, 1990). These calibration results imply that a broad class of non-expected utility theories c...
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作者：Pavan, Alessandro; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
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作者：Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We consider a sequential decision problem where the decision maker is informed of the actual payoff with delay. We introduce a new condition, which generalizes the condition given by Blackwell and ensures that the decision maker can approach a fixed closed and convex set under delay. We show how the convergence rate to the approachable set is sensitive to changes in the information lag and apply our approachability strategy to games with one-sided incomplete information and to regret-free stra...
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作者：Penta, Antonio
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper extends the belief-free approach to robust mechanism design to dynamic environments, in which agents obtain information over time. A social choice function (SCF) is robustly partially implemented if it is perfect Bayesian incentive compatible for all possible beliefs. It is shown that this is possible if and only if the SCF is ex-post incentive compatible. Robust full implementation imposes the stronger condition that, for all possible beliefs, all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria induce...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Cao, Dan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Georgetown University
摘要：We extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by allowing incumbents to undertake innovations to improve their products, while entrants engage in more radical innovations to replace incumbents. Our model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of growth driven by both entry of new firms and productivity improvements by continuing firms. The model generates a non-degenerate equilibrium firm size distribution driven by entry of new firms and expansion exit of existing firms. ...
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作者：Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper provides an explicit characterization of correlations that are implicitly captured by partition models for incomplete information games. The main result of this paper shows that every partition model for incomplete information can be decomposed into the conjunctions of a unique non-redundant model and a unique individually uninformative correlating device. The separation of the correlating device from the underlying non-redundant model allows us to separate their strategic implicati...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Muller, Rudolf
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Maastricht University
摘要：In a social choice setting with quasilinear preferences and monetary transfers, a domain D of admissible valuations is called a monotonicity domain if every 2-cycle monotone allocation rule is truthfully implementable (in dominant strategies). D is called a revenue equivalence domain if every implementable allocation rule satisfies the revenue equivalence property. We introduce the notions of monotonic transformations in differences, which can be interpreted as extensions of Maskin's monotonic...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Said, Maher
作者单位：University of Toronto; New York University
摘要：We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of their values, and then privately learn the value realizations in period two. Buyers in the second cohort are last-minute shoppers that already know their values upon their arrival in period two. The se...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Rady, Sven; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; University of Bonn; University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider a game of strategic experimentation in which players face identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that equilibrium experimentation ceases at the same threshold belief at which a single agent would stop, even if players can coordinate their...
