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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a novel way with a solid strategic justi...
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作者：Horner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Yale University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payoff set and its limit vanishes at rate (1 - delta)(1/2) under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1 - delta)(1/4) under imperfect monitoring. For strictly individually rational payoff vectors, these rates improve to 0 (i.e., all strictly individually rational payoff vectors are exactly achieved as equilibri...
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Berentsen, Aleksander; Waller, Christopher
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University; University of Basel
摘要：We study the use of asset-backed money in a neoclassical growth model with illiquid capital. A mechanism is delegated control of productive capital and issues claims against the revenue it earns. These claims constitute a form of asset-backed money. The mechanism determines (i) the number of claims outstanding, (ii) the dividends paid to claim holders, and (iii) the structure of redemption fees. We find that for capital-rich economies, the first-best allocation can be implemented and price sta...
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作者：Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew; Imhof, Lorens A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have fast convergence to a set A if the models both reach A quickly and leave A slowly, where quickly and slowly refer to whether the expected hitting and exit times remain bounded when N tends to infinity. We provide simple and general Lyapunov criteria which are sufficient for reaching quickly and leaving slowly. We use these criteria to determine aspects of learning models that promote fast convergence. (C) 2015 El...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：It is well known that the Hotelling-Downs model generically fails to admit an equilibrium when voting takes place under the plurality rule (Osborne, 1993). This paper studies the Hotelling-Downs model considering that each voter is allowed to vote for up to k candidates and demonstrates that an equilibrium exists for a non-degenerate class of distributions of voters' ideal policies - which includes all log-concave distributions - if and only if k >= 2. That is, the plurality rule (k = 1) is sh...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito; Narita, Yusuke
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the effect of different centralized public school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school improves, i.e., becomes more preferred by students. We first show that neither any stable mechanism nor mechanism that is Pareto efficient for students (such as the Boston and top trading cycles mechanisms) resp...
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作者：Bohren, J. Aislinn
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper demonstrates that a misspecified model of information processing interferes with long-run learning and allows inefficient choices to persist, despite sufficient information for asymptotic learning. I consider an observational learning environment in which agents observe a private signal about an unknown state and some agents observe the actions of their predecessors. Individuals face an inferential challenge when extracting information from the actions of others, as prior actions ag...
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作者：Mihm, Maximilian
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：Motivated by experimental and empirical evidence, I study a framework where reference-points such as a status quo, endowment, or default option - can distort the way an individual responds to ambiguity. I characterize a model of reference-dependent maxmin expected utility, and provide behavioral foundations for comparing reference-dependent ambiguity attitudes. I also illustrate some implications of reference dependent ambiguity for trade in an asset market, including underdiversification, no-...
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作者：Xiao, Jun
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper studies complete-information, all-pay contests with asymmetric players competing for heterogeneous prizes. In these contests, each player chooses a performance level or score. The first prize is awarded to the player with the highest score, the second less valuable prize to the player with the second highest score, etc. The players are asymmetric as they incur different scoring costs, and they are assumed to have ordered marginal costs. The prize sequence is assumed to be either geo...
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作者：He, Wei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
