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作者：Mas, Michael; Nax, Heinrich H.
作者单位：University of Groningen; University of Groningen; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：'Noise' in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested 'what kind of noise' is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on 'how noise matters' for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur w...
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作者：Harstad, Bard
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：A conservation good (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller prefers to conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction implies that the market for conservation cannot be efficient and conservation is likely to fail. A leasing market is inefficient for similar reasons and dominates the sales market if and only if the...
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作者：Liu, Tingjun
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I analyze the effects of heterogeneity in terms of bidders' valuation distributions and standalone values in equity auctions-auctions in which bidders offer equities rather than cash. Heterogeneity misaligns equity bids' face values, monetary values, and bidder types, making the seller's revenues sensitive to the auction design. Given heterogeneity, I identify the mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue among all incentive-compatible mechanisms of equity auctions. I show how different so...
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作者：Veller, Carl; Hayward, Laura K.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Columbia University
摘要：We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these mutations occur sufficiently infrequently, the dynamics over all population states simplify to an ergodic Markov chain over just the pure population states (where each population is monomorphic). This makes calculation of the stationary distribution computationally...
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作者：Trejos, Alberto; Wright, Randall
作者单位：INCAE Business School; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：Many applications in monetary economics of search-and-bargaining theory use Shi-Trejos-Wright, hereafter STW; many applications in finance use Duffie-Garleanu-Pedersen, hereafter DGP. These models share several features, and both concern liquidity, yet they also differ: in STW agents use assets as payment instruments when trading goods; in DGP they pay with goods (or transferable utility) when trading assets. We integrate the two. This clarifies connections between the literatures, and generat...
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作者：Guimaraes, Bernardo; Pereira, Ana Elisa
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Michelacci, Claudio; Pijoan-Mas, Josep
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider a competitive equilibrium growth model where technological progress is embodied into new jobs which are assigned to workers of different skills. In every period workers decide whether to actively participate in the labor market and if so how many hours to work on the job. Balanced growth requires that the job technology is complementary with the worker's total labor input on the job, which is jointly determined by his skill and his working hours. Since lower skilled workers can sup...
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作者：Gabaix, Xavier; Laibson, David; Li, Deyuan; Li, Hongyi; Resnick, Sidney; de Vries, Casper G.
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Fudan University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：This paper describes a mechanism that sustains high markups, even in markets with homogenous goods and many competing firms. We show that random utility models with idiosyncratic taste shocks driven by standard noise distributions produce, in large markets, robustly high equilibrium markups that are insensitive to the degree of competition. For example, with Gaussian noise and n firms, markups are asymptotically proportional to 1/root In n; consequently, a hundred-fold increase inn, from 10 to...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：An assignment of students to schools displays zero-segregation if all schools have the same distribution of the different types of students (ethnic, geographical, gender). We axiomatize the choice of an optimally desegregated assignment under arbitrary capacity constraints. The celebrated Consistency axiom, together with standard rational choice requirements, identify the choice rule minimizing a canonical index of proportional fairness: the entropy of the assignment matrix. This is an alterna...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei; Wallace, Neil
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University
摘要：A three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage, agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group. Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined ...
