How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru
• 署名单位: Yale University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.05.001
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 332-359
• 关键词: Repeated games; Rates Of Convergence

摘要

We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payoff set and its limit vanishes at rate (1 - delta)(1/2) under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1 - delta)(1/4) under imperfect monitoring. For strictly individually rational payoff vectors, these rates improve to 0 (i.e., all strictly individually rational payoff vectors are exactly achieved as equilibrium payoffs for 8 high enough) and (1 - delta)(1/2), respectively. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.