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作者：Wang, Chong; Wang, Neng; Yang, Jinqiang
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; Naval Postgraduate School; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a tractable incomplete-markets model with an earnings process Y subject to permanent shocks and borrowing constraints. Financial frictions cause the marginal (certainty equivalent) value of wealth W to be greater than unity and decrease with liquidity w = W/Y. Additionally, financial frictions cause consumption to decrease with this endogenously determined marginal value of liquidity. Risk aversion and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution play very different roles on consum...
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作者：Williamson, Stephen D.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：A model of money, credit, and banking is constructed in which the differential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium - an upward-sloping nominal yield curve. Purchases of long-maturity government debt by the central bank are always a good idea, but for unconventional reasons. A floor system is preferred to a channel system, as a floor system permits welfare-improving asset purchases by the central bank. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Chatterjee, Satyajit; Eyigungor, Burcu
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：This paper proves that the standard quasi-geometric discounting model used in dynamic consumer theory and political economics does not possess Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) with continuous decision rules, if there is a strictly positive lower bound on wealth. It is shown that these discontinuities imply that the decision-maker strictly prefers lotteries over next period's assets. An extension with lotteries is presented, and the existence of an MPE with continuous decision rule is establishe...
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作者：Iaryczower, Matias; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Essex
摘要：We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman's policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible. But the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy chang...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asu
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a theoretical model of security investments in a network of interconnected agents. Network connections introduce the possibility of cascading failures due to an exogenous or endogenous attack depending on the profile of security investments by the agents. We provide a tractable decomposition of individual payoffs into an own effect and an externality, which also enables us to characterize individual investment incentives recursively (by considering the network with one agent removed...
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作者：Ahn, David S.; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Essex
摘要：We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Arie, Guy
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：The marginal cost of effort often increases as effort is exerted. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, dynamically increasing costs create information asymmetry. This paper characterizes the optimal contract and helps explain the popular yet thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for example, in sales-force compensation. The result is obtained by complementing the standard dynamic program with a novel dynamic dual formulation. The dual program is monotonic and sub-modular, providing str...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Liu, Ce; Martinez, Seung-Keun
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We provide a universal condition for rationalizability by risk-averse expected utility preference in a demand-based framework with multiple commodities. Our test can be viewed as a natural counterpart of a classical test of expected utility, due to Fishburn (1975), in a demand setting. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gu, Chao; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We provide a series of results for a standard model where exchange is facilitated by liquid assets. Compared to past work, minimal structure is imposed on the mechanism determining the terms of trade. Four simple axioms lead to a class of mechanisms encompassing common bargaining theories, competitive price taking and other solution concepts. Using only the axioms, we establish existence and (perhaps more surprisingly) uniqueness of stationary monetary equilibrium. We also show how to support ...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian; Bradley, Richard
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes' rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes' rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: responsiveness, which requires that ...
