Random extensive form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
• 署名单位: Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.010
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 517-535
• 关键词: Random games; Extensive form games; subgame-perfect equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; implementation

摘要

We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a novel way with a solid strategic justification to implement a Pareto efficient outcome for two-player implementation problems. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.