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作者：Chen, Bo; Fujishige, Satoru; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Zhejiang University; Kyoto University; University of York - UK
摘要：We analyze a decentralized process in a basic labor market where finitely many heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly in pursuit of higher payoffs over time and agents may behave myopically. We find a general random decentralized market process that almost surely converges in finite time to a competitive equilibrium of the market. A key proposition en route to this result exhibits a finite sequence of successive bilateral trades from an arbitrary initial market state to a s...
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作者：Copic, Jernej; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; California Institute of Technology; University of St Andrews
摘要：A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Ishii, Ryosuke
作者单位：McGill University; Teikyo University
摘要：An important form of commitment is the ability to restrict the set of future actions from which choices can be made. We study a simple two player dynamic game of complete information which incorporates this type of commitment. For a given initial game, the players engage in an endogenously determined number of commitment periods before choosing from the remaining actions. We show the existence of equilibria with pure strategies in the commitment periods. Partial characterization results for ge...
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作者：Hernandez, Penelope; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A celebrated result of Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) states that in repeated games, when the players are restricted to playing strategies that can be implemented by finite automata and they have lexicographic preferences, the set of equilibrium payoffs is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. In this paper we explore the limitations of this result. We prove that if memory size is costly and players can use mixed automata, then a folk theorem obtains and the se...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Kovac, Eugen
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Duisburg Essen
摘要：The paper extends the optimal delegation framework to a dynamic environment where the agent initially has private information merely about the distribution of the state and learns the true state only as the relation proceeds. The principal may want to elicit the agent's initial information and offers a menu of delegation sets where the agent first chooses a delegation set and subsequently an action within this set. We characterize environments under which it is optimal and under which it is no...
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作者：Liu, Hong; Wang, Yajun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Market makers in some financial markets often make offsetting trades and have significant market power. We develop a market making model that captures these market features as well as other important characteristics such as information asymmetry and inventory risk. In contrast to the existing literature, a market maker in our model can optimally shift some trades with some investors to other investors by adjusting bid or ask. As a result, we find that consistent with empirical evidence, expect...
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作者：Aguiar, Victor H.; Boccardi, Maria Jose; Dean, Mark
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Columbia University
摘要：Satisficing is a hugely influential model of boundedly rational choice, yet it cannot be easily tested using standard choice data. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic choice data to be consistent with satisficing, assuming that preferences are fixed, but search order may change randomly. The model predicts that stochastic choice can only occur amongst elements that are always chosen, while all other choices must be consistent with standard utility maximization. Adding...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; da Silva, Pietro; Faro, Jose Heleno
作者单位：Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Getulio Vargas Foundation; Universidade Federal de Sergipe; Insper
摘要：We consider an economy populated by smooth ambiguity-averse agents with complete markets of securities contingent to economic scenarios, where bankruptcy is permitted but there is a penalty for it. We show that if agents' posterior belief reductions given by their average probabilistic beliefs do not become homogeneous then an equilibrium does not exist. It is worth noting that our main result does not imply any convergence of ambiguity perception or even the attitudes towards it. In this way,...
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作者：Horan, Sean
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：I provide choice-theoretic foundations for a simple two-stage model, called transitive shortlist methods, where choices are made by sequentially by applying a pair of transitive preferences (or rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Despite its simplicity, the model accommodates a wide range of choice phenomena including the status quo bias, framing, homophily, compromise, and limited willpower. I establish that the model can be succinctly characterized in terms of some well-documente...
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作者：Hughes, Niall
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that when single district elections are used to fill a legislature, we get back to a world where the median voter matters. An extreme policy will generally only come about if it is preferred to a more moderate policy by the median voter in a majority of districts. The mere existence of a centrist party can lead to moderate outcomes even...
