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作者：Barlo, Mehmet; Carmona, Guilherme; Sabourian, Hamid
作者单位：Sabanci University; University of Surrey; University of Cambridge
摘要：We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded memory (recall) strategies. Our main result demonstrates that any payoff profile that exceeds the pure minmax payoff profile can be approximately sustained by a pure strategy finite memory subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if the players are sufficiently patient. We also show that the result can be extended to any payoff profile that exceeds the mixed minmax payoff profile if players can rand...
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作者：Xu, Zibo
作者单位：Singapore University of Technology & Design
摘要：This paper presents a collection of convergence results on best-response dynamics in extensive-form games. We prove that in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect information, every solution trajectory to the continuous-time best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium component. We show the robustness of-this convergence in the sense that along any interior approximate best-response trajectory, the evolving state is close to the set of Nash equilibria most of the time. We...
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作者：Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：A seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment, with buyers that differ in their patience: Each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation. First, we derive the optimal mechanism, neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline. The deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer. Depending on the ...
