Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Wei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 181-194
• 关键词: Discontinuous Bayesian game; Behavioral strategy; Random disjoint payoff matching; Equilibrium existence; all-pay auction

摘要

We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.