Instability of belief-free equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 261-286
• 关键词: Belief-free equilibrium; evolutionary stability; private monitoring; Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; COMMUNICATION

摘要

Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy even a very mild stability refinement. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.