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作者：Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：The competing mechanisms literature is extended to a market setting in which firms have fixed capacity, and there is a continuum of consumers who desire multiple units and can only purchase from one firm. Firms choose incentive compatible mechanisms in which consumers report their utility types; consumption of the good and payments of the numeraire are continuous functions of the reports. Uniform price auctions with reserve prices, reinterpreted as direct mechanisms, are not consistent with eq...
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作者：Glode, Vincent; Opp, Christian C.; Zhang, Xingtan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We characterize optimal voluntary disclosures by a privately informed agent facing a counterparty endowed with market power in a bilateral transaction. Although disclosures reveal some of the agent's private information, they may increase his information rents by mitigating the counterparty's incentives to resort to inefficient screening. We show that when disclosures are restricted to be ex post verifiable, the informed agent optimally designs a disclosure plan that is partial and that implem...
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作者：Guney, Begum; Richter, Michael; Tsur, Matan
作者单位：Ozyegin University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Vienna
摘要：Numerous studies and experiments suggest that aspirations for desired but perhaps unavailable alternatives influence decisions. A common finding is that an unavailable aspiration steers agents to choose similar available alternatives. We propose and axiomatically characterize a choice theory consistent with this aspirational effect. Similarity is modeled using a subjective metric derived from choice data. This model offers implications for consumer welfare and its distribution between rich and...
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作者：Kendall, Chad; Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We experimentally study the market selection hypothesis, the classical claim that competitive markets bankrupt traders with biased beliefs, allowing unbiased competitors to survive. Prior theoretical work suggests the hypothesis can fail if biased traders over-invest in the market relative to their less biased competitors. Subjects in our experiment divide wealth between consumption and a pair of securities whose values are linked to a difficult reasoning problem. While most subjects in our ma...
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作者：Michau, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：To investigate secular stagnation, I add two features to a standard Ramsey model with money: (i) House-holds have a preference for wealth; (ii) Wages are downward rigid. In this framework, there exists a frictionless neoclassical steady state equilibrium characterized by a low natural real interest rate. In addition, if wages are sufficiently rigid and the natural real interest rate sufficiently low, then there also exists a Keynesian secular stagnation steady state characterized by under-empl...
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作者：Blume, Lawrence E.; Cogley, Timothy; Easley, David A.; Sargent, Thomas J.; Tsyrennikov, Viktor
作者单位：Cornell University; New York University
摘要：If two rational agents want to trade and there are no externalities, then trade is Pareto improving. Economists generally oppose restrictions on such trade. Complete markets allocations are Pareto optimal and thus complete markets are generally viewed as good. But when individuals want to trade because of heterogeneous beliefs, this standard argument is less compelling. We illustrate this in a standard general equilibrium setting and explore potential social benefits from restrictions on trade...
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作者：Honryo, Takakazu
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：This paper constructs a model of dynamic persuasion. A sender attempts to persuade a decision maker (DM) by sequentially revealing verifiable arguments, but this incurs communication costs. In equilibrium, the sender decides when to give up, and the DM decides when to make a decision. We characterize the DM-optimal equilibrium. We further show that the DM gains from making a stochastic commitment, and provide a condition under which it also makes the sender better-off. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Doval, Laura
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I study a single-agent sequential search problem as in Weitzman (1979). Contrary to Weitzman, conditional on stopping, the agent may take any uninspected box without first inspecting its contents. This introduces a new trade-off. By taking a box without inspection, the agent saves on its inspection costs. However, by inspecting it, he may discover that its contents are lower than he anticipated. I identify sufficient conditions on the parameters of the environment under which I characterize th...
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作者：Li, Shengwu; Yu, Ning Neil
作者单位：Harvard University; Nanjing Audit University; Stanford University
摘要：An agent makes consumption choices in multiple periods. Choice objects vary in type and quality; objects of the same type are inter-temporal substitutes. The current choice set is informative about the distribution over future choice sets. Thus, the presence of unchosen alternatives may rationally alter the agent's choice. Under some simple assumptions, the optimal policy exhibits context-dependent choice behavior, such as the decoy effect and choice overload. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights...
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作者：Rivera, Thomas J.
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper analyzes the issue of implementing correlated and communication equilibria when pre-play communication is restricted to a particular network (e.g., a hierarchy). When communication between the mediator and the players is not direct and private, as assumed when invoking the revelation principle, there may be incentives for other players in the communication network to misbehave while players report their private information to the mediator and the mediator sends suggested actions to ...
