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作者：Beccuti, Juan; Moeller, Marc
作者单位：University of Bern
摘要：This paper considers dynamic bilateral trade with short-term commitment. We show that, when the seller is more patient than the buyer, there exist systematic differences between the optimal selling and renting mechanisms. While the former consists of simple price-posting, the latter induces the buyer to choose between a secure- and a random-delivery contract. Allowing for mechanisms more general than price-posting reduces the seller's cost of learning the buyer's valuation in the renting case....
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作者：Gonzalez, Francisco M.; Lazkano, Itziar; Smulders, Sjak A.
作者单位：University of Waterloo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee; Tilburg University
摘要：We show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias, which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience. This underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations. We explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time. We argue that future bias creates incentives to...
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作者：Rahi, Rohit; Zigrand, Jean-Pierre
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare. When private signals are noisy, so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices, discouraging information gathering may be Pareto improving. Complementarities in informa...
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作者：Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this result explains the predominant role of single-peakedness as a domain restriction in models of political economy and elsewhere. The main result has a number of corollaries, among them a dual characteriza...
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作者：Anderson, Edward; Holmberg, Par
作者单位：University of Sydney; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Cambridge
摘要：We consider a uniform-price procurement auction with indivisible units and private independent costs. We find an explicit solution for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is unique if demand shocks are sufficiently evenly distributed. The equilibrium has a price instability in the sense that a minor change in a supplier's realized cost can result in a drastic change in the market price. We quantify the resulting volatility and show that it is reduced as the size of indivisible units decreases. ...
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作者：Baeuerle, Nicole; Jaskiewicz, Anna
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Wroclaw University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies a one-sector optimal growth model with i.i.d. productivity shocks that are allowed to be unbounded. The utility function is assumed to be non-negative and unbounded from above. The novel feature in our framework is that the agent has risk sensitive preferences in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (1995). Under mild assumptions imposed on the productivity and utility functions we prove that the maximal discounted non-expected utility in the infinite time horizon satisfies the o...
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Glasgow
摘要：We consider convex dynamic programs with general (bounded) recursive utilities. The Contraction Mapping Theorem fails when the utility aggregator does not obey any discounting property. This failure occurs even with traditional aggregators and certainty equivalent specifications. However, the Bellman operator admits a unique fixed point when an interior policy is feasible. This happens because utility values are unique at interior consumption plans and, when an interior perturbation is feasibl...
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作者：Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Piacentino, Giorgia
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital. We find that they make their contracts depend on public information, e.g. credit ratings or benchmark indices, as a way to attract flows, rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems, as has been emphasized in the literature. Unfortunately, asset managers' competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom: asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is so...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey; University of Vienna
摘要：We consider games with an endogenous sharing rule and provide conditions for the invariance of the equilibrium set, i.e., for the existence of a common equilibrium set for the games defined by each possible sharing rule. Applications of our results include Bertrand competition with convex costs, electoral competition, and contests. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lu, Jay; Saito, Kota
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We provide a theory of random intertemporal choice. Agents exhibit stochastic choice over consumption due to preference shocks to discounting attitudes. We first demonstrate how the distribution of these preference shocks can be uniquely identified from random choice data. We then provide axiomatic characterizations of some common random discounting models, including exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In particular, we show how testing for exponential discounting under stochastic ch...
