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作者：Robson, Arthur J.; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Yale University
摘要：We examine the evolutionary foundations of risk attitudes in age-structured populations. The effect of idiosyncratic risk concerning fertility or mortality rates is captured by the corresponding mean fertility or mortality rate. The effect of aggregate risk, relative to the mean, varies with the type of risk and age. We establish conditions under which aggregate risk in fertility rates at young ages increases the population growth rate (compared to the corresponding mean fertility), but such r...
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作者：Ellman, Matthew; Hurkens, Sjaak
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This paper characterizes profit- and welfare-maximizing reward-based crowdfunding, defined by an aggregate funding threshold for production. We disentangle crowdfunding's selling and funding roles, locating its key benefit in its market test role of adapting production to demand. Multiple prices prove necessary for effective learning and adaptation, even with relatively large crowds. Mechanism design proves general optimality in our baseline and shows the value of limiting reward quantities. F...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Mukherjee, Saptarshi
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Udaipur (IIMU); Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi
摘要：We consider implementation of the efficient state in a large population public goods game. Due to positive externalities, the efficient state is different from the Nash equilibrium of the game. We apply a transfer scheme equal to the externality in the game. The externality adjusted public goods game is a potential game with a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the efficient state of the original game. It is also a continuous strategy aggregative game. We introduce the best response dynamic for...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：In developing the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE), Marshall (1890) used the notion of a representative firm. The identity of this firm, however, remained unclear. Subsequent theory either focused on the case where all firms are identical or else incorporated heterogeneity but disregarded the notion of a representative firm. Using Hopenhayn's (1992) model of competitive industry dynamics, we extend the theory of LRCE to account for heterogeneous firms and show that the long-ru...
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作者：Prokopovych, Pavlo; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：Kyiv School of Economics; University of Iowa
摘要：This paper develops a new approach to investigating equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with many asymmetric bidders whose types are affiliated and valuations are interdependent and not necessarily strictly increasing in own type. We begin with studying a number of continuity-related properties of the model, which are used, in conjunction with tieless single crossing and H-convexity, to establish the existence of monotone approximate interim equilibria. Then we provide two sets of su...
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作者：Bezin, Emeline
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：A model which formalizes the interplay between green consumer culture and sustainable technology is used to revisit the trade-off between economic growth and environmental preservation. The theory includes (i) green preferences formed through cultural transmission which involves rational socialization actions, (ii) innovation endogenously directed to sustainable or unsustainable sectors depending on culture through market size effects. The model captures an important feature of sustainable inn...
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作者：Liang, Annie
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Suppose an analyst observes inconsistent choices from either a single decision-maker, or a population of agents. Can the analyst determine whether this inconsistency arises from choice error (imperfect maximization of a single preference) or from preference heterogeneity (deliberate maximization of multiple preferences)? I model choice data as generated from imperfect maximization of a small number of preferences. The main results show that (a) simultaneously minimizing the number of inferred ...
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作者：Karakaya, Mehmet; Klaus, Bettina; Schlegel, Jan Christoph
作者单位：Izmir Katip Celebi University; University of Lausanne; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tenants a top trading cycles (TTC) rule is consistent if and only if its underlying priority structure satisfies our acyclicity condition. Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two ...
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作者：Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：We analyze the design and performance of equity auctions when bidder's valuations and opportunity costs are private information, distributed according to an arbitrary joint density that can differ across bidders. We identify, for any incentive compatible mechanism, an equivalent single-dimensional representation for uncertainty. We then characterize the revenue-maximizing and surplus-maximizing equity mechanisms, and compare revenues in optimal equity and cash auctions. Unlike in cash auctions...
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作者：Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco; Petri, Henrik
作者单位：University of Sussex; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bath; University of Sussex; University of Bath
摘要：Lemma 2 (and hence the statement of Theorem 1) in Manzini and Mariotti (2018) is incorrect as stated. For the claim to hold an additional axiom is required. We correct the mistake in the proof in Manzini and Mariotti (2018). (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
