Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karakaya, Mehmet; Klaus, Bettina; Schlegel, Jan Christoph
• 署名单位: Izmir Katip Celebi University; University of Lausanne; City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: Consistency; house allocation; matching; strategy-proofness; top trading cycles

摘要

We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tenants a top trading cycles (TTC) rule is consistent if and only if its underlying priority structure satisfies our acyclicity condition. Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two specific rules, YRMH-IGYT (you request my house - I get your turn) and efficient priority rules, that are applied in two steps. Moreover, even if no priority structure is a priori given, we show that a rule is a top trading cycles rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities if and only if it satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and either reallocation-proofness or non-bossiness. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.