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作者：Gorno, Leandro
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：This paper studies preference identification in a general framework that allows for partial observability of optimal choices: Decision makers select some optimal alternatives, but not necessarily all of them. While partial observability is a methodologically appealing assumption for empirical applications, it makes recovering preferences much harder. The main result provides abstract conditions on classes of preferences and decision problems ensuring identification. The result is applied to se...
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作者：Zheng, Charles Z.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper investigates the conditions for full preemption of conflicts in the form of all-pay auctions. I define two notions of conflict preemption: to implement peace on path with commonly expected continuation plays should one veto a peace proposal, or to secure that each player accepts a peace proposal no matter what continuation play he might expect to occur should he veto it. For each notion I prove a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the primitives. The conditions imply tha...
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作者：Ait-Sahalia, Yacine; Matthys, Felix
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We study the consumption-portfolio allocation problem in continuous time when asset prices follow Levy processes and the investor is concerned about potential model misspecification. We derive optimal consumption and portfolio policies that are robust to uncertainty about the hard-to-estimate drift rate, jump intensity and jump size parameters. We also provide a semi-closed form formula for the detection-error probability and compare various portfolio holding strategies, including robust and n...
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作者：Chi, Chang Koo; Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Aalto University
摘要：We analyze all-pay auctions with affiliated values and binary signals. We analyze the unique symmetric equilibrium with any number of bidders and show that the bidders earn positive rents only if the equilibrium is monotone. We also characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the closely related two-player war of attrition. We compare expected revenues across these formats. All-pay auctions result in lower expected rents to the bidders than standard auctions, but they also induce inefficient all...
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作者：Lei, Xiaowen
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper studies wealth inequality in a Blanchard/Yaari model with idiosyncratic investment returns. Its key innovation is to assume that individuals can buy information. Information reduces uncertainty about the unknown mean investment return. Reduced estimation risk encourages investment in higher yielding risky assets. As a result, endogenous information acquisition amplifies wealth inequality. Wealthy individuals buy more information, which leads them to invest a higher share of their we...
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作者：Gama, Adriana; Rietzke, David
作者单位：Colegio de Mexico; Lancaster University
摘要：In this paper, we employ lattice-theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest a class of games for which best-replies are generically non-monotonic. Using the same approach, we obtain several comparative statics in a Cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes. Our analysis illustrates how lattice-theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non-monotonic best-replie...
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作者：Jadbabaie, Ali; Kakhbod, Ali
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study optimal contracting between a firm selling a divisible good that exhibits positive externality and a group of agents in a social network. The extent of externality that each agent receives from the consumption of neighboring agents is privately held and is unknown to the firm. By explicitly characterizing the optimal multilateral contract, we demonstrate how inefficiency in an agent's trade propagates through the network and creates unequal and network-dependent downward distortion in...
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作者：Herrenbrueck, Lucas
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：How do central bank purchases of illiquid assets affect asset prices and the real economy? To answer this question, I construct a model with heterogeneous households - some households need money more urgently than others and thus hold more of it. Households (and the government) can trade in frictional asset markets. I find that open market purchases are fundamentally different from helicopter drops: asset purchases stimulate private demand for consumption goods at the expense of demand for ass...
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作者：Bervoets, Sebastian; Faure, Mathieu
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：The stability of Nash equilibria has often been studied by examining the asymptotic behavior of the best-response dynamics. This is generally done in games where interactions are global and equilibria are isolated. In this paper, we analyze stability in contexts where interactions are local and where there are continua of equilibria. We focus on the public good game played on a network, where the set of equilibria is known to depend on the network structure (Bramoulle and Kranton, 2007), and w...
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作者：Ke, T. Tony; Villas-Boas, Miguel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A Bayesian decision maker is choosing among two alternatives with uncertain payoffs and an outside option with known payoff. Before deciding which alternative to adopt, the decision maker can purchase sequentially multiple informative signals on each of the two alternatives. To maximize the expected payoff, the decision maker solves the problem of optimal dynamic allocation of learning efforts as well as optimal stopping of the learning process. We show that the decision maker considers an alt...
