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作者：Gizatulina, Alia; Hellman, Ziv
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We show that contrary to currently widely-held misperceptions, the classical no trade theorem obtains even under heterogeneous priors. That is, when priors are not common, speculative trade is still impossible under common knowledge of rationality. However, trade becomes mutually acceptable if at least one party to the trade puts at least some slight probability on the other party being irrational. We also derive bounds on disagreements in the case of heterogeneous priors and common p-beliefs....
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作者：Schottmueller, Christoph
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：A decision maker repeatedly asks an adviser for advice. The adviser is either competent or incompetent and knows his type privately. His preferences are not perfectly aligned with the decision maker's preferences. Over time, the decision maker learns about the adviser's type and will fire him if the adviser is likely to be incompetent. If the adviser's reputation for competence improves, he is less likely to be fired for incompetence but this makes pushing his own agenda more attractive to him...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：University of Bristol; Northwestern University
摘要：We prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium in a Bewley-Aiyagari model with idiosyncratic shocks. This is an exchange economy with an infinite horizon and one consumption good, and with each agent facing idiosyncratic endowment shocks at each period; the agents may trade their endowments for the only asset, fiat money. The government increases the money supply at a constant growth rate that induces inflation in a stationary monetary equilibrium. We identify the n...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana R.; Song, Yangwei
作者单位：University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We consider a canonical problem in economics: the financing and provision of a public good. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that under natural information and enforcement frictions, the probability of providing the public good falls to zero as the population size goes to infinity even if provision of the public good is efficient. In this paper, we allow agents to have multiple prior beliefs about others' valuations and to make choices that reflect their aversion to that ambiguity. We show ...
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作者：Gabrovski, Miroslav; Ortego-Marti, Victor
作者单位：University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：This paper develops a business cycle model of the housing market with search frictions and entry of both buyers and sellers. The housing market exhibits a well-established cyclical component, which features three stylized facts: prices move in the same direction as sales and the number of houses for sale, but opposite to the time it takes to sell a house. These stylized facts imply that in the data housing vacancies and the number of buyers are positively correlated, i.e. that the Beveridge Cu...
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作者：Jeong, Daeyoung
作者单位：Pohang University of Science & Technology (POSTECH); Pohang University of Science & Technology (POSTECH)
摘要：We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational superiority to decision makers who vote on a proposal. We show that an expert's simple cheap talk strategy can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their opinions. After observing the expert's cheap talk message, decision makers may ignore their private information and vote according to the expert's interest, even though they know the expert has her own bias. ...
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作者：Ordonez, Guillermo; Perez-Reyna, David; Yogo, Motohiro
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Princeton University
摘要：We study a dynamic model of collateralized credit markets with asymmetric information, which allows for a rich set of signaling strategies based on the path of debt and repayment. Whether credit history reveals private information about credit quality depends on the degree of uncertainty in collateral value. When uncertainty is low, good borrowers fully and costlessly separate by deleveraging, that is borrowing a sufficiently high amount such that subsequent repayment reveals the presence of u...
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作者：Straub, Ludwig; Ulbricht, Robert
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We explore a mechanism by which second moments-such as cross-sectional dispersions, risk, volatility, or uncertainty-naturally and endogenously fluctuate over time as nonlinear transformations of fundamentals. Specifically, we provide theoretical results that characterize second moments of transformed random variables when the underlying fundamentals are subject to distributional shifts that affect their means, but not their variances. We illustrate the usefulness of our results with a series ...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We show that contrary to currently widely-held misperceptions, the classical no trade theorem obtains even under heterogeneous priors. That is, when priors are not common, speculative trade is still impossible under common knowledge of rationality. However, trade becomes mutually acceptable if at least one party to the trade puts at least some slight probability on the other party being irrational. We also derive bounds on disagreements in the case of heterogeneous priors and common p-beliefs....
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作者：Dizdar, Deniz; Moldovanu, Benny; Szech, Nora
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; University of Bonn; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Agents in a finite two-sided market are matched assortatively, based on costly investments. Besides signaling privately known, complementary types, the investments also directly benefit the match partner. The bilateral external benefits induce a complex feedback cycle that amplifies the agents' signaling investments. Our main results quantify how the feedback effect depends on the numbers of competitors on both sides of the market. This yields detailed insights into the equilibria of two-sided...
