On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prokopovych, Pavlo; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: Kyiv School of Economics; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.012
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: First-price auction; Payoff security; Monotone equilibrium; Generalized convexity

摘要

This paper develops a new approach to investigating equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with many asymmetric bidders whose types are affiliated and valuations are interdependent and not necessarily strictly increasing in own type. We begin with studying a number of continuity-related properties of the model, which are used, in conjunction with tieless single crossing and H-convexity, to establish the existence of monotone approximate interim equilibria. Then we provide two sets of sufficient conditions for the game to have a sequence of monotone approximate equilibria whose limit points are pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.