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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Gama, Juan Pablo; Novinski, Rodrigo; Pascoa, Mario R.
作者单位：Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Faculdade de Economia e Financas do Ibmec; University of Surrey
摘要：When the discount factors that infinite lived consumers use at each date are not predetermined but are instead chosen within some set, depending on what the consumption plan is, impatience might not hold. More precisely, if the utility is the infimum of discounted utilities over that set of discount factor sequences, then preferences may be just upper semi-impatient. Such lack of lower semi-impatience, which we refer to as wariness, consists in neglecting distant gains but not distant losses. ...
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作者：Moreira, Alan
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I build a model in which financial intermediation slows down capital flows. Investors optimally learn from intermediary performance to allocate capital toward profitable intermediaries. Intermediaries reach for yield-i.e., they invest in high-tail-risk assets-in an attempt to drive flows and reduce liquidation risk. Intermediaries with strong opportunities face a trade-off between choosing a portfolio that maximizes profitability, and choosing one that maximizes the speed at which capital flow...
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作者：Carrasco, Vinicius; Fuchs, William; Fukuda, Satoshi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper considers an optimal renegotiation-proof dynamic Bayesian mechanism in which two privately informed players repeatedly have to take a joint action without resorting to side-payments. We provide a general framework which accommodates as special cases committee decision and collective insurance problems. Thus, we formally connect these separate strands of literature. We show: (i) first-best values can be arbitrarily approximated (but not achieved) when the players are sufficiently pat...
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作者：Thomas, Caroline
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper adapts the exponential/Poisson bandits framework to a model of reputation concerns. The result is a dynamic signalling game with changing types. We study a decision-maker who must choose the stopping time for a project of unknown quality when she is concerned both about social welfare and public beliefs about her ability, which is correlated with the project's quality. The decision-maker privately observes a Poisson process that is informative about whether the project will succeed ...
